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This thesis examines the perceptions of personnel of the Navy
Medical Department regarding the organizational restructuring which
took place in 1989. Included in the thesis is a background
discussion of the change effort including underlying causes, the
nature of the restructuring, and implementation methods. Data for
the thesis came from reference reviews, personal interviews with
key players, and a survey questionnaire. The target population for
the survey questionnaire was the financial management professionals
within the Medical Department. The change effort is evaluated
utilizing models drawn from change literature and focuses on
comparing planned versus perceived actual outcomes, the perceptions
of effectiveness of change leadership, and the perceived current
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A. Area of Study
This thesis is about change. It is about the way change
is conceived and implemented in a large organization, and how
specific members of that organization perceive the change
process and the results of the change. It is about measuring
the success of a change effort.
In this thesis, the change effort that is studied is the
1989 restructuring of the United States Navy Medical
Department. It is studied from the viewpoint of the members
of the Medical Department defined as Financial Management
Professionals. The purpose of the study is to evaluate the
perceived success of the change effort.
B
.
Scope of the Thesis
In their book "Changing Ways", Murray M. Dalziel and
Stephen C. Schoonover, describe successful change as one in
which "...change leaders share information with those most
affected by change to instill consistent expectations about
the change and its ramifications throughout the organization"
[Ref. l:p. 16]. One focus of the thesis, therefore, is to
compare the objectives of the change effort undertaken in the
1989 restructuring, as stated or defined by the change
leaders, with the objectives perceived by the Financial
Professionals in the Medical Department. The study is limited
to objectives dealing specifically with the financial
management of the Medical Department, but also examines some
of the broader objectives of the Medical Department as a
whole
.
Also included in the scope of the thesis is an evaluation
of the change effort based upon the perceived effectiveness of
the change leadership and on perceived outcomes. The
evaluation of leadership is based upon the effectiveness of
the change leadership at determining, communicating and
implementing the objectives of the change at both Headquarters
and lower echelons. Outcomes are evaluated based on a
comparison of the study respondents' perceptions of the status
of specific criteria relating to the Medical Department's
structure, mission, and environment, both before and after the
change effort.
C. Primary and Secondary Research Questions
The research questions explored in this thesis are listed
below.
1. Primary Research Question:
The primary research question of this thesis, based upon
the perceptions of the Financial Management Professionals, is:
Was the change effort defined as the 1989 restructuring of the
Department successful? This question has two major aspects.
First, did the restructuring accomplish the overall and
financial management objectives envisioned by the change
planners? Second, is the restructured Medical Department the
remedy required to cure the long-standing problems facing Navy
Medicine?
2 . Secondary Research Questions :
1. What were the underlying causes of the change effort
and who were the primary change agents?
2. What organizational and financial management objectives
did the change leaders envision being achieved as a
result of the restructuring?




How consistent were the implementers of the change at
the Headquarters and Field Activities at interpreting
the objectives of the restructuring?
5. How do personnel in different demographic groups (i.e.;
Headquarters versus Field) view the change effort?
6. How do perceptions of the current overall and financial
management operations compare with perceived
effectiveness of operations before the restructuring?
D. Organization of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five
chapters. The content of each chapter is described below.
• Chapter II Background: Description of the Navy Medical
Department including: a history of the department; the
mission, structure, and procedures of the Department of
the Navy Medical Blue Ribbon Panel; the old and new
organizational structures; and the implementation of the
Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations.
• Chapter III Theoretical Framework: A description of
organizational change processes as described in management
literature utilizing models which focus on change
implementation, measurement of planned to actual outcomes,
and classifying the success of change efforts.
• Chapter IV Methodology and Data: A description of the
techniques used for data collection and analysis.
• Chapter V Results: A presentation and analysis of the
data collected from interviews and surveys as they relate
to the primary and secondary research questions.
• Chapter VI Conclusions and Summary: An evaluation of the
success of the Navy Medical Department in implementing the
change effort based upon the theoretical models described
in Chapter III and the analysis of data in Chapter V as
they relate to the primary and secondary research
questions .
• Appendices A through C: These appendices include the
Survey Questionnaire, data tables, and references.
E. Definitions and Acronyms




Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) : Headquarters
activity of the Navy Medical Department following the
1989 restructuring. Successor activity to the Navy
Medical Command.
2. Dental Treatment Facility (DTF) : Navy Dental Clinic.
3 . Department of the Navy Medical Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) :
Temporary panel chartered to study and recommend
changes for improving mission performance of the Navy
Medical Department.
4. Field Activities: All commands of the Navy Medical




Geographical Command (GEOCOM) : Echelon three command
reporting to the Navy Medical Command responsible for
specific operations of medical and Dental Treatment
Facilities within a geographical region.
6. Headcruarters Activities: Prior to the 1989
restructuring, these consisted of NAVMEDCOM and the
GEOCOMs . After 198 9 these consisted of BUMED and the
HSOs.
7. Healthcare Support Office (HSO) : Detachments of BUMED
created as a result of the 1989 restructuring who
perform regional coordination, consolidation, and
support functions.
8. Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) : Navy Hospitals and
Clinics
.
9. Navy Medical Command (NAVMEDCOM) : Primary headquarters
activity of the Navy Medical Department prior to the
1989 restructuring. Predecessor activity to the Bureau
of Medicine and Surgery.
10. Navy Medical Department: All Headquarters, Field, and





The Office of the Director of Navy
Medicine/Surgeon General under the Chief of Naval
Operations
.
12. Other Activities: Offices and Commands which are part
of the Navy Medical Department but not defined as
either a Headquarters or Field Activity. These include
commands with research, education, and environmental
health missions, as well as OP-093.
13. Regional Line Commander (RLC) : After the 1989
restructuring, the line officer in a specific region
responsible for the provision of medical care to
beneficiaries within the region.
14. Surgeon General (SG) : A Medical Corps Vice Admiral who
serves as the Director of Navy Medicine (OP-093) , and
as the Commander of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
The senior officer of the Navy Medical Department.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CHANGE EFFORT
A. HISTORY OF THE NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT 1
The Navy Medical Department has existed as an entity
almost from the creation of the Navy itself. For most of its
life it was known as the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
(BUMED) , and, consisted of a headquarters activity which
coordinated the recruitment, assignment, and training of
medical personnel, along with the various branch hospitals
around the world. The reporting chain for hospital commanders
varied according to the size and location of the facility.
The hospital commanders reported to either the local base
commanders, the commandant of the naval district, or BUMED.
In 1974 the responsibilities of BUMED greatly expanded,
and the chain of command was redirected. Hospital Commanders
no longer reported to base commanders. Instead, they reported
to the commanders of the nearest major medical treatment
facility. These facilities were renamed Naval Regional
Medical Centers (NRMC) and typically had from two to five
subordinate commands. The NRMC Commanders, in turn, reported
directly to the Chief of BUMED, who was also the Surgeon
1 Much of the material appearing in this section was
previously published in the article "Managing Organizational
Change within the Navy Medical Department" by Lt John C.
Espie, Navy Comptroller , Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1990.
General and the Medical Resource Sponsor in the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) , Code OP-093.
In 1982, the Inspector General of the Navy determined that
the Surgeon General's span of control had become too broad to
effectively manage the Medical Department. The NRMCs were
dissolved and a new echelon of command was established. Eight
regional commands, known as Geographical Commands (GEOCOMs)
,
were created. All fixed medical treatment facilities within
the region reported to the GEOCOM Commander. BUMED was
renamed The Navy Medical Command (NAVMEDCOM) , and placed under
the command of a Rear Admiral. The Surgeon General was
limited to the performance of his OP-093 duties.
These rapid changes in organization were primarily driven
by external forces. The rising cost of medical care,
increasing Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniform
Services (CHAMPUS) payments, the shortage of medical care
providers, and the increasing focus on quality assurance, all
stimulated reevaluation of the organizational structure and a
continuing search for methods to improve economy and
efficiency
.
During this period the provision of medical care was
viewed as strictly the concern of the Medical Department.
However, in spite of their rank and role as a resource
sponsor, the Surgeons General discovered they had a difficult
time competing for resources with line requirements. As a
result, subsequent funding and personnel constraints resulted
in a drain of resources from the treatment facilities in order
to establish and operate the GEOCOMs . As the GEOCOMs grew
through the accrual or assignment of additional mission
functions, the drain on the medical resources of the treatment
facilities was aggravated. This led to increased provider
shortages and a further reliance on CHAMPUS . Thus the
reorganized Medical Department was unable to correct the
problems it was designed to combat.
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MEDICAL BLUE RIBBON PANEL2
1 . Establishment and Mission
In April of 1988, the Navy Inspector General reported
to the CNO that the 1982 reorganization had failed to achieve
its objectives. The Inspector General wrote:
Despite the extensive reorganization initiated from
recommendations of the Naval Inspector General's
inspection of BUMED in 1982, the leadership of navy
medicine has been unable to sustain the needed quantity of
medical care or readiness when faced with scarce fiscal
and personnel resources. Morale of medical personnel
continues to fall and beneficiary frustration with
perceived loss of health care benefits and difficulty with
access is growing. ... It is imperative that a clearly
defined organization which will provide strong leadership,
management expertise, cohesiveness and purpose be
implemented, nurtured and held accountable if a viable
Navy health care delivery system is to be resurrected.
[Ref. 2:p. 2]
2
. Except where cited by direct reference, material
presented in the remainder of this chapter was compiled from
a review of the documents listed in Appendix C, and from
personal interviews with members of the BPP task forces, MED-
01, and OPNAV.
The Inspector General went on to list numerous recommendations
for improving the operations of Navy medicine.
On 24 May, 1988, the CNO issued a memorandum which
established the Department of the Navy Medical Blue Ribbon
Panel (BRP) . The mission of the BRP was to investigate and
develop short and long term solutions for the problems of the
Navy's health care delivery system. [Ref. 3:p. A-l]
2 . Organizational Structure of the Blue Ribbon Panel
The BRP was composed of eight members and was chaired
by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) . The other
members of the panel were:
• Director of Navy Medicine (OP-093)
• Deputy CNO (Navy Program Planning) (OP-08)
• Deputy CNO (Logistics) (OP-04)
• Deputy CNO (Manpower, Personnel and Training) (OP-01)
• Director of Marine Corps Logistics Plan, Policies, and
Strategic Mobility (CMC (LP))"
• Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) (ASN (M&RA)
)
• Past President, Maine Medical Center
The membership of the panel was designed to overcome
traditional medical/line divisions of authority and give a
broad spectrum of senior decision makers opportunities to
address Navy medicine's problems. A distinguished physician
from the civilian sector was included to provide private
sector perspective and insight. [Ref. 3:p. 15]
Subordinate to the BRP was a Flag Officer Working
Group (FOWG) . This group consisted of 18 members who were
recognized as subject matter experts with the requisite
knowledge and experience to investigate specific problems
found in the Medical Department. The FOWG was responsible for
developing reports and recommendations for BRP consideration.
Task forces, chaired by members of the FOWG, studied
the following functional areas:
• Organization and Management
• Clinical Operation and Medicine
• Manpower, Personnel and Training
• Contracting
• Budget execution
• Equipment Procurement and Maintenance
The mission of the task forces was to identify and
examine problems within their area of expertise. For each
identified problem, the task forces explored alternative
solutions, proposed recommendations and implementation plans,
prepared cost estimates, and reported progress to the FOWG.
With some limitations, the task forces were given the
authority to take appropriate action to resolve problems.
When those problems were beyond that authority, their
conclusions and recommendations were forwarded to the FOWG and
BRP for action as appropriate.
10
The FOWG reviewed the progress of the task forces at
twelve meetings over the period May 1988 through May 1989.
The BRP itself met six times during the same period. Although
the above meetings were still being conducted to monitor
progress, the final report of the BRP, which contained a
summary of all findings and recommended actions, was published
on 21 November 1988.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
1 . Navy Medicine
The organizational structure of Navy medicine as it
existed from 1982 - 1989 is shown in Figure 1. The
Organization and Management Task Force identified three
problems resulting from this structure. These were:





GEOCOMs consume manpower and do not properly perform
the intended functions.
3. Naval Medical Clinic Commands unnecessarily consume
limited health care resources.
Specific structural changes to the Medical Department
were recommended as solutions to the above problems.
Reorganizing the Office of the Surgeon General and NAVMEDCOM
back to the BUMED structure under command of the Surgeon
General was recommended as the solution to problem 1 . The
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Figure 1: Organizational structure 1982-1989
echelon of command represented by the GEOCOMs and return both
the personnel and funding to the MTFs/DTFs. In addition, it
was recommended the command of the regional clinics be
returned to the MTFs as the solution to problem 3.
The task force also recommended assigning
responsibility for the provision of medical care to the line.
Line responsibility was to be exercised by rerouting the
chain-of-command for the field activities. The basis for this





The Task Force also concluded. . .that the lack of line
involvement/responsibility in resourcing the medical
department was detrimental. Line commanders expressed
concern over their inability to resolve problems
concerning access to medical care. The Task Force
considers Medical Type Commanders (MEDTYCOMs) subordinate
to the Fleet Commanders in Chief (CINCs) , as replacements
for the GEOCOMs, would improve resource allocation and
line involvement. The CINCs would be responsible and/or
accountable for allocating resources to their medical
priorities. [Ref. 3:p. 25]
As this recommendation represented a radical shift in
the focus and operations of both the Fleet Commanders and the
Medical Department, the BRP recommended that a 90 day study
group be established to "identify the best plan and schedule
for transitioning to a MEDTYCOM organization" [Ref. 3:p. 26].
This study was conducted under the auspices of the Center for
Naval Analysis (CNA) . It was headed by two retired line
admirals, with the participation of personnel from NAVMEDCOM,
OPNAV, and the Fleet
.
The report of the CNA study was presented to the BRP
in February 1989. The report concluded that the MEDTYCOM
structure recommended by the BRP was unworkable. This was
based primarily on two factors: the unwillingness of the
Fleet Commanders to assume full control for medical
operations; and the difficulties in allocating and
distributing resources, particularly CHAMPUS dollars.
Instead of the MEDTYCOM, the study recommended the
establishment of a dual chain-of-command for navy medicine as




































Figure 2: Organizational Structure after 1989
the MTFs/DTFs, including the direct medical /dental services
function, would fall to the line and be exercised through a
Responsible Line Commander (RLC) , who in turn would report
through the CINCs. However, Primary and Technical Support
would remain with BUMED under the Surgeon General. This
support would include the financial management functions of
obtaining, allocating, and distributing resources.
In addition, in order to assist BUMED in absorbing
functions formerly performed at the GEOCOMs , and to circumvent
headquarter' s manning restrictions, Healthcare Support Offices
(HSOs) were created. The HSO' s were intended to act as
14
coordinating activities for the implementation of BUMED policy
at the MTFs/DTFs, without being in the direct chain-of-command
between those activities and BUMED.
The new organizational structure was approved by the
BRP and the Secretary of the Navy in May 1989. It was
implemented on 1 October 1989 at the beginning of Fiscal Year
1990.
2 . Financial Management
Financial management for the Medical Department is the
responsibility of the Deputy Commander for Resources, MED-01,
a Senior Executive Service position. As shown in Figure 1,
prior to 1989, this position fell under the Commander of
NAVMEDCOM. During the restructuring this position was
incorporated within BUMED, (see Figure 2) . All aspects of
budgeting and financial reporting, including CHAMPUS, are
coordinated by the MED-01 support staff.
Prior to the restructuring, all financial resources,
with the exception of CHAMPUS funding, were allocated and
distributed to the GEOCOMs . The GEOCOMS were Expense
Limitation Holders (ELH) , and in turn, issued Operating
Budgets (OB) to the various activities under their control.
Similarly, budget calls were issued by MED-01 to the GEOCOMS,




Under the original BRP proposal, MED-01 would have
distributed all resources, including CHAMPUS funding, to the
MEDTYCOMs . This was viewed as untenable by both MED-01 and
the Fleet Comptrollers from the standpoint of resource
control. The input to the CNA Study from these two groups was
crucial to the decision to abandon the MEDTYCOM proposal, in
favor of the structure which incorporated the HSOs, and used
them as a tool for resource administration.
Under the new organizational structure, MED-01 issues
ELHs to the HSO's. As in the old organizational structure,
CHAMPUS funding is centrally controlled. The HSOs, in turn,
issue OBs to the field activities based upon specific
direction from Med-01. Therefore, while the HSO' s perform
coordination and consolidation functions, they have no direct
decision making authority over the allocation of resources to
the field activities. There is a direct link in the chain-of-
command between the field controllers, and MED-01.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRP RECOMMENDATIONS
Within the Medical Department there were three primary
teams which were responsible for the implementation of the BRP
recommendations. These were:
• The Rapid Implementation Team (RIT)
• The Management Assist Teams (MATs)
• The BUMED Transition Team
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The Rapid Implementation Team was headed by a Medical
Corps Rear Admiral and was tasked with implementing the BRP
recommendations at the National Naval Medical Center (NNMC)
,
Bethesda, MD . As the premier site for navy medicine and
health education, the goal of the team was to make NNMC a
model medical facility for other treatment activities to
emulate. This was to be done by stressing total quality
management techniques, internal restructuring and
streamlining, and flexible utilization of resources.
One mechanism used to spread the lessons learned from the
RIT's experiences at Bethesda to the rest of the medical
department was via the Management Assist Teams. The MATs were
established in support of a specific recommendation of the
Organization and Management Task Force of the BRP which felt
that many senior medical department managers were inadequately
trained in methods to judge success/failure of management
techniques or to optimally allocate resources internally [Ref
.
3:p. 33]. The charter of the MATs was "to provide on-site
assistance and training to Navy Hospital Managers to improve
their management and organizational productivity assessment
skills" [Ref. 4:p. 2]. The mission of the MATs, therefore,
was to assist managers of Field activities assess internal
operations, and restructure those operations if required,
consistent with the objectives established by the BRP for
solving the longstanding problems of the Medical Department.
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Beginning in February 1989, the MATs visited 20 CONUS
MTFs . Based upon the success of those visits, and the
positive response from the Field activities, the MAT'S
recommended in their final report that the MAT concept be
continued and that the methodology be implemented throughout
BUMED as an ongoing responsibility of the BUMED staff.
Accordingly, in the new organizational structure, this
assignment was tasked to the Health Service Offices.
Coordination of the MAT's findings and overall
implementation within the Medical Department was the
responsibility of the BUMED Transition Team. This team was
composed of three members-- two active duty Medical Service
Corps Captains, and one Naval Reserve officer. During the
spring and summer of 198 9, following approval of the new
organizational structure, the Transition Team was responsible
for overseeing subsequent change efforts, and reporting the
progress achieved back to the BRP
.
E. FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS FROM 1989 TO PRESENT
The final meeting of the Blue Ribbon Panel was held in May
1989. At that time the new organizational structure was
forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy for approval. The
restructuring was begun on 1 October 1989 and was scheduled
for completion on 1 October 1990.
Due to the rapidity of the organizational changes and the
longstanding durability of the problems facing the Medical
18
Department, two successor committees to the BRP were
established. These were: The Flag Level Medical Working
Committee (FLWC) ; and the Standing Medical Board (SMB) . These
two committees continue to track the issues and problems
addressed by the BRP
.
In December 1990, BUMED instigated a study of the Mission
and Function of the HSOs . This study solicited input from the
RLCs and MTF/DTF Commanders regarding the role, necessity, and
justification for the continued existence of the HSO's. The
responses from those surveyed indicated that the HSO' s played
a vital role in the distribution of resources and encouraged




In discussing the change process, Dalziel and Schoonover
[Ref. 1: p. 11] describe change as a state of mind or
attitude in which leadership must ask three key questions:
1. Is the organization ready?
2. Is there the right mix of skills to make the change
happen?
3. Will the implementation process be successful?
This chapter presents a description of the change process
compiled from current management literature which focuses on
methods for answering these questions. Later chapters will
use this description as a backdrop against which to view the
restructuring of the Navy Medical Department.
B. THE INITIATION OF CHANGE
Change can be defined as the movement, or transition, of
an organization from one state to another. The factors which
stimulate that movement, and the processes by which the
organization is moved have been extensively researched.
Nearly every general management textbook includes a discussion
revolving around the management of change and there is a large
20
library of volumes dealing specifically with the change
process
.
In her book "The Change Masters", Rosabeth Kanter, gives
the following definition of change.
Change involves the crystallization of new action
possibilities (new policies, new ideas, new patterns, new
methodologies, new products, or new market ideas) based
upon reconceptualized patterns in the organization. The
architecture of change involves the design and
construction of new patterns, or the reconceptualization
of old ones, to make new, and hopefully, productive
actions possible. [Ref. 6:p. 279]
Similar to Ms. Kanter' s definition, but in simpler terms,
Deal and Bolman define change as the process by which managers
"... look at old problems in a new light and attack old
challenges with different and more powerful tools." [Ref. 7:p.
4]
The stimulus for change can come from a variety of
sources. Primary among these are environmental factors.
Again, the impact of environment on organizations has been
extensively researched and discussed in management literature.
Griffin presents a model which shows the organization
enveloped by the external environment [Ref. 8:p. 80] . Griffin
classifies the external environment into two levels, a general
external environment divided into dimensions such as
Sociocultural and Economic, and a task environment consisting
of specific stakeholders such as regulators and customers.
Each of these divisions of the external environment exerts
forces on the organization which can initiate a change
21
process. In addition, Griffin shows the internal dimensions
of the organization, such as employees, policies, and culture
which can exert similar forces. Griffin's model as adapted
for the Navy Medical Department is shown in Figure 3.
The organization, then, must maintain a balance between
its structure and operations, and the environmental forces
within and surrounding it. Beer describes this process as
maintaining congruency between the organization' s goals and
the environment in which it exists. He writes:
Managers redesign structure and processes in response to
changes in people or the environment so that congruence












Figure 3: Griffin's Environmental Model for Navy Medicine
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and effectiveness can be maintained. They may also
initiate efforts to design new organizational forms, adopt
new management practices, and develop people in an effort
to achieve congruent patterns of people, structure,
process and environment which is more effective than a
former pattern. [Ref. 9:p. 6]
Kanter views this process somewhat differently and writes
that "...organizational change is stimulated not by pressures
from the environment, resulting in a buildup of problems
triggering an automatic response, but by the perceptions of
that environment and those pressures held by key actors."
[Ref. 6:p. 280]
Nevertheless, whether change is viewed as resulting from
real or perceived environmental pressures, change is viewed as
inevitable. Griffin, citing work by Kotter and Schlesinger 3
,
states that most organizations must implement some change each
year, with major overhauls every four to five years [Ref. 8:p.
393] .
C. STRATEGY, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES
As described by Flippo and Munsinger the thrust of most
organizations is to reduce and manage the uncertainty that can
result from environmental pressures [Ref. 10:p. 111]. The
setting of organizational strategy, with its attendant goals
and objectives, is the process used to perform this task.
3
. Kotter, John P. and Schlesinger, Leonard A.,
"Choosing Strategies for Change", Harvard Business Review
,
March-April 1979, p. 106.
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The link between strategy and objectives is noted in the
work of Alfred Chandler who defined strategy as "...the
determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of
the enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these
goals." [Ref. 11 :p. 13] In line with Chandler, McNichols
defines one aspect of strategy as an action which "...is
directed toward accomplishing specific objectives." [Ref.
12 :p. 3] Goals and objectives, then, are central to the
operation of the organization.
The concept of an objective is defined by Hitt,
Middlemist, and Mathias [Ref. 13:p. 148]. They write:
An objective is a desired future result. It should be so
formulated that in its pursuit, the organization can
navigate successfully within its environment.
In their description, an objective must have the following
characteristics
:
• Precise and including a measured result.
• Communicated to all organizational members.
• Compatible with other objectives.
They go on to describe the purposes of objectives to:
• define the role that an organization plays in the
environment
.
• help decision makers to coordinate their activities.
• provide a sense of direction and serve as guides for
making and implementing decisions.
• serve as standards for measuring performance.
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Within the above framework it can be seen that poorly
chosen, and inadequately communicated objectives can decrease
management's effectiveness at dealing with environmental
forces. The process for setting objectives, therefore,
becomes critical. Flippo and Munsinger write:
Organizations can not establish objectives, only people
can. With organizations composed of many groups, with
somewhat different goals, the determination of the set of
objectives often involves conflict. [Ref. 10: p. 84]
Along this same theme, Chung writes:
An organization as an inanimate entity does not have goals
per se, but the people in it do. Organizational goals
reflect the common interests of the members of the
organization. To the extent that people need
organizations, and vice versa, compatibility develops
between the two sets of goals (personal and
organizational) . Conflict occurs when one group of an
organization achieves its goals at the expense of another.
[Ref. 14: p. 5]
Organizations, therefore, must create mechanisms to
coordinate competing groups, and to link individual efforts to
shared goals. According to Deal and Bolman, formal
coordination and control is achieved in two ways: vertically
through commands, supervision, policies, rules, planning, or
control systems; and laterally through meetings, task forces,
committees and matrices [Ref. 7:p. 57]. This vertical and
lateral integration, therefore, can be used by organizations
to establish objectives which are consistent with the strategy
used to accomplish the organization's mission.
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D. RELATIONSHIP OF STRUCTURE TO STRATEGY
There are many factors which can influence the shape or
structure of an organization, and, in fact, restructuring is
one of the most common management approaches to organizational
change. Deal and Bolman describe five factors they believe
most influence organizational design [Ref. 7: p. 65]. The
factors they describe are:




3 . Information Technology
4. Characteristics of Members
5. Goals and Strategy
McNichols writes that the design of an organization, and
choice of structure, is a distinct strategic decision integral
to overall organizational strategy as described by its
operational and root objectives [Ref. 12:p. 479]. He supports
this idea by quoting Andrews 4 :
. . . the nature of corporate strategy must be made to
dominate the design of organizational structure and
processes. That is, the principle criterion for all
decisions on organizational structure and behavior should
be their relevance to the achievement of the
organizational purpose, not to their conformity to the








The Concept of Corporate
Strategy , Homewood, IL. , Dow- Jones-Irwin, 1971, p. 181.
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Bolman and Deal echo this relationship between strategy,
objectives and organizational structure. They describe
structure as follows:
How to structure itself is one of the central issues
facing any organization. A structure is more than boxes
and lines arranged hierarchically on an official
organization chart. It is an outline of the desired
patterns of activities, expectations, and exchanges among
executives, managers, employees, and customers or clients.
The shape of the formal structure very definitely enhances
or constrains what an organization is able to accomplish.
[Ref. 7:p. 46]
Beckhard and Harris, drawing upon the work of Chandler,
Galbraith and others present a view of the evolution of
organizational structure theory. They state that
historically, structure was defined by the reporting and
control requirements of the organization. This resulted in
the hierarchy or authority based models of organization.
However, Beckhard and Harris postulate that as task complexity
increases, authoritative organizational structures based upon
communication and control requirements become less effective
at the work to be performed. Instead, form should follow
function. The tasks to be accomplished by an organization
should be prioritized, and a structure developed to optimize
overall performance of those tasks. Beckhard and Harris write
that the natural evolution of structure as task complexity
increases is from a functional to a mission or program
oriented structure and finally, if required to a matrix
structure. [Ref. 15:pp. 69-76]
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Organizational structure, therefore, among the other
factors listed above, is dependent upon the tasks to be
performed and the objectives to be met. Changes in structure
will be required as management strategy changes, and new tasks
or objectives are developed in response to environmental
pressures such as technology changes, political climate
changes, or changes in leadership. Organizations which
operate in rapidly changing or highly uncertain environments
will require complex and flexible structures. [Ref. 7: p. 73]
E. MODELS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE
The organizational theorist, Kurt Lewin, described the
change process as occurring in three distinct steps. The
first step is unfreezing the organization by leading the
individuals who will be affected by the change into an
understanding of why the change is necessary. The second step
is actually implementing the required change. The third and
final step is reinforcing the change and helping it become
part of the status quo, or as Lewin describes it, refreezing
the organization. Lewin' s model is valuable in that it
emphasizes the importance of planning, communicating, and
reinforcing the change, but the very simplicity of the model
limits its practical application. [Ref. 8:p. 394]
A more comprehensive model (Figure 4) , is described by
Griffin as a series of steps that lead from the recognition of
change, through the establishment of goals, and onto
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implementation and evaluation [Ref. 8:p. 394]. Curzon
describes a similar comprehensive model (Figure 5) , which
divides the change effort into nine discrete steps [Ref. 16 :p.
8] . Both authors conclude that a well defined process must be
followed or the probability of failure will be high.
Like Lewin, Dalziel and Schoonover describe organizational
change as consisting of three phases
:
preparing the
organization for change; choosing the right people for
effective teamwork; and implementing the right interventions
to produce visible results [Ref. l:pp. 133-145]. However,
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Figure 4: Griffin's Model for
the Steps of Change.
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Figure 5: Curzon' s Model for
the Steps of Change.
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they contend that these three phases must be broken into
smaller series of discrete steps similar to those of Griffin
and Curzon. In addition, they describe five key processes
which support implementation [Ref. l:p. 108]. These are:
1. Clarifying Plans: A process in which implementors
define, document, and specify the change.
2. Integrating New Practices: The process by which
change is incorporated into operations.
3. Providing Education: A process that fosters
programs in which end users learn about and use new
approaches and procedures.
4. Fostering Ownership: A process through which end
users come to identify new processes and procedures
as their own, rather than regarding them as changes
imposed upon them.
5. Giving and Getting Feedback: A process in which a
detailed objective is specified and input from the
team is used to judge its effectiveness in the
implementation plan.
The keys to all four of the models described above is that
the implementation of change must proceed in an orderly
fashion, beginning with extensive planning and selling of the
change to the members of the organization, and ending with an
extensive evaluation of the change and the implementation
strategy that was used.
F. EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF A CHANGE EFFORT
Evaluating the success of a change effort can be a
slippery process, one which depends heavily on the skill and
viewpoint of the evaluator. Beckhard describes several
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pitfalls which can entrap the unwary evaluator. These
include: failure to clarify the purpose of the evaluation;
attempting to collect too much data on the change effort; and
choosing the wrong time to perform the evaluation. [Ref.
15:pp. 92-98]
To avoid these pitfalls Beckhard describes an evaluation
plan which should be part of the overall implementation plan
of the change effort. [Ref. 15:p. 98] The evaluation plan
should include the following elements:
• Clarity and agreement about the purpose or priorities of
the evaluation.
• Determination of required information and selection of
appropriate sources of the needed information.
• Decision about who will receive the data from the
evaluation (users and feedback to sources)
.
• Decision on when to evaluate and selection of data-
collection and analysis methods.
• Determination of resources required and available,
selection of required resources, and clarification of the
role of staff.
The process that Beckhard describes above is one of how an
evaluation should be conducted and not what should be the
determining criteria of success. In large part, those
determining criteria will be based upon the type of change and
the extent of the evaluation. Beckhard describes several
bases for evaluating the success of a change effort. Two of
these are: The Total System Performance Review; and monitoring
the effects of a specific intervention. [Ref. 15:p. 87-88]
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The Total System Performance review is a focus on the
outcomes of the change effort. This review is based upon a
comparison of the results of the change interventions with the
stated organizational goals and objectives established prior
to implementation. Beckhard lists the following key
questions
:
• To what extent has the desired condition been achieved?
• In what areas is further change required?
• What, if any, unanticipated consequences have resulted
from the change effort?
• What are the current attitudes of personnel systemwide to
the current condition of the organization?
• How satisfied is top management with the current, or near
future condition of the organization?
• How well does the system now function in performing the
organization' s mission?
Monitoring a specific intervention is the evaluation of a
single management action to determine if a desired outcome has
been obtained, and what additional 'ripple effect' that
intervention has caused in other parts of the organization.
If unexpected, or undesirable reactions to the intervention
have occurred, then remedial action can be taken. However,
Beckhard concedes, the overall change strategy probably
consists of multiple interdependent interventions, or a single
intervention with multiple interrelated goals, making the
evaluation of a single action problematic. [Ref . 15:pp. 92-98]
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Both of these processes described by Beckhard depend upon
the measurement of outcomes against stated objectives.
However, as Beer describes, the quantifiable measurement of
specific criteria is not the only way to evaluate the success
of a change effort. Beer, who discusses change as an aspect
of organizational development, judges the success of a change
effort on a variety of factors largely based upon members of
the organization embracing and sustaining new behaviors. He
states that success can be evaluated by examining the
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards offered as a result of the
change effort. [Ref. 9:p. 56-57]
The first measurement of success is based upon intrinsic
rewards, or "feelings' members have toward the change and the
organization. Beer writes:
In order for change to spread throughout the organization
and become a permanent fixture... It is desirable but not
necessary for the results of the change to be
quantifiable. In fact, experience with change suggests
that a direct positive experience by managers with the
change may be at least as powerful, if not more powerful,
than quantitative measures ... Thus, direct feelings of
success appear to be more important than quantifiable
measures. When individuals, groups, and whole
organizations feel more competent than they did before the
change, this increased sense of competence reinforces the
new behavior and solidifies learning associated with the
change. [Ref. 9:p. 64]
Beer states, however, that intrinsic rewards are
insufficient to sustain new patterns of behavior and improved
performance. Extrinsic rewards, in the form of monetary,
promotion, or supervisor recognition must immediately follow
initial success if self-confidence and competence as a result
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of the change is to be maintained. Beer states that many
organizational changes fail because the organization' s formal
systems, peer group relationships, exercise of authority, and
culture fail to support, or frustrate the new behaviors of the
organization's members. [Ref. 9:p. 64]
Beer summarizes his approach by describing organizational
change as a learning process which must be carefully
orchestrated by the change leaders. These leaders must
"articulate a new direction, consistently use symbols to
communicate their vision, model desired behavior, create
settings to induce desired behavior, and consistently
reinforce behavior..." [Ref. 9:p. 68]
Given the difficulties of evaluating any specific change
effort, a practical comprehensive model for evaluating change
might be one which combines the processes described by
Beckhard and Beer. This model would include a measurement of
specific objective oriented outcomes, as discussed by
Beckhard, and an evaluation of the change leadership, and the
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards resulting from the change, as
discussed by Beer.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A . METHODOLOGY
1 . Data Collection Techniques
In order to answer the primary and secondary research
questions it was necessary to establish the objectives of the
restructuring of the Medical Department, and to test the
perceived importance of those objectives from the perspective
of the target population, the Medical Department professional
Financial Managers. In addition, an evaluation of the overall
success of the restructuring required that data be collected
regarding both the perceived effectiveness of the techniques
used during the change effort, and of the perceived status of
the Medical Department before and after the restructuring.
The three methods used to gather this information are
described below.
a . Reference Review
The first phase of research was a review of the
written documentation produced during the change effort. This
included reports of the Navy Inspector General, the Minutes of
both the BRP and FOWG meetings, briefings presented to the BRP
by NAVMEDCOM and Task Force personnel, and the final Report of
the BRP. A complete listing of the documents reviewed during
this phase of research is contained in Appendix C.
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The purpose of this review was to obtain background
knowledge required to describe the change effort and to
determine the objectives and expected outcomes of the
restructuring. It was also intended to define the roles and
relationships of key players.
b. Interviews
Some key players identified during the reference
review were interviewed either in person or by phone. These
included members of the BRP Organization and Management Task
Force, members of the MAT and RIT teams, senior personnel of
MED- 01, and a member of the Burned Implementation Team. In
order to promote frankness, all interviews were conducted on
a non-attribution basis.
The purpose of the interviews was to clarify
content of written references, identify objectives not
explicitly stated elsewhere, test the validity of
interpretations of reference material, and obtain additional
insights for the preparation of the survey questionnaire.
The interviews were unstructured, focusing on the
interviewee's area of expertise. However, the following
specific questions were addressed during each interview.
1. What were the objectives of the restructuring?
2. What was your role in the change effort?
3. Who do you feel was the primary driving force which
initiated the change process?
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4 . Do you feel this change effort was an attempt by the
Line Navy to seize control of the Medical Department?
5. Is the restructuring going to solve the long standing




The final source of data was a survey questionnaire
used to obtain input from the target population, which is
described in Section 2 below. The survey questionnaire is
included as Appendix A.
The purpose of the questionnaire was threefold:
1. Obtain quantitative perceptual data regarding:
Importance of objectives.
Achievement of objectives.
Relative status of specific management indicators
after the restructuring.
2. Obtain quantitative data regarding perceived
effectiveness of change processes used during the
restructuring
.
3. Obtain qualitative input regarding future change
efforts
.
In addition to the above, demographic information was obtained
to facilitate the analysis of the survey responses.
The survey questionnaire was divided into five
sections. The content and rationale for each of these
sections is described below.
(1) Background Information
:
This section contains the demographic data.
Data were gathered in three principle categories.
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1. Length and Type of Service: Used to evaluate the level
of experience of the survey population and to eliminate
respondents who were not part of the target population
throughout the defined change period of May 8 8 to Aug
90.
2. Rank/Grade: Used to evaluate responses from junior and
senior personnel.
3. Duty Station: Used to evaluate responses from
different echelons, to track the movement of personnel
between types of commands and levels, and to identify
respondents who were drawing upon Out-CONUS
experiences
.
Responses from personnel at commands other than
the headquarters activities and the MTFs/DTFs were grouped
under 'OTHER' since they were not directly impacted by the
majority of the structural changes to the Medical Department.
Commands Out-CONUS were also somewhat outside the
implementation process and structural changes due to their
physical remoteness. Therefore, the data from these two
groups were flagged so that their perceptions could be
compared against those who were more central to the change
effort
.
(2) The Reorganization Process
:
In this section data were collected to
determine respondent's perceptions of three aspects of the
change: a) evaluate the underlying causes which prompted the
change effort; b) identify the principle change agents; and c)
identify the means of communication used during the change
effort. In addition perceptual data were obtained on the
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effectiveness of both the respondent's command, and of BUMED
in implementing the changes recommended by the BRP . The data
gathered in this section will be used to analyze and judge the
success of the change effort following the Beer model [Ref . 9]
discussed in Chapter III, Section E.
(3) Objectives of the Reorganization
This section listed 16 objectives and requested
an evaluation of the importance and level of achievement for
each. The evaluation was based on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = low,
7 = High), with the option of giving no opinion.
The following objectives were taken from the
Final BRP report. The objective numbers correspond with the
item number in the Survey Questionnaire.
I. Transfer Professional Expertise to MTFs . [Ref. 3: p.
25]
4. Improve Communication and coordination by shortening
the Chain-of Command. [Ref. 3: p. 25]
7. Make GME Navy Medicine's #1 priority. [Ref. 3: p. ES-7]
8. Enhance the command/control of the Surgeon General.
[Ref. 3: p. ES-14]
9. Make the Line responsible for the provision of health
care. [Ref. 3: p. ES-9]
10. Create a structure for ongoing Management Assist Visits
from upper echelons. [Ref. 3: p. ES-11]
II. Increase budget flexibility at the MTF' s by the removal
of SAG restrictions. [Ref. 3: p. 133]
16. Control/reduce CHAMPUS costs. [Ref. 3: p ES-1]
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The following three objectives were drawn from
the personal interviews.
6. Shield Navy Medicine from overall Defense budget cuts.
14. Minimize reorganization's impact on daily financial
operations at field commands.
15. Standardize long and short range financial planning and
reporting.
The remaining objectives listed below were
drawn from the change literature described in Chapter III.
While these objectives were not officially stated by the BRP
or others interviewed, they were included in the survey to
test if there were other objectives perceived by the
respondents to be influencing the change effort. Objectives
2, 3, and 5 relate to the specific hierarchical structure of
the medical department. Objective 12 relates to a planning
strategy, and objective 13 relates to the underlying
philosophy behind the change effort.
2. Decentralize authority/operations to the MTF's. [Ref.
8: pp. 292-293]
3. Centralize authority/operations at BUMED/HSOs. [Ref. 8:
pp. 292-293]
5. Standardize internal organizational structure and
operations at Field Commands. [Ref. 7: p. 81]
12. Establish formal mechanisms at all commands for
planning and managing change. [Ref 1: pp. 13-14]
13. Stimulate creative management thinking and innovative
practices. [Ref. 6: p. 19]
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(4) Comparative Status of the Medical Department
This section of the survey was designed to
measure the perceived impact of the restructuring on the
status of the Medical Department. As discussed in Chapter
III, Section E, the Beer model for evaluating the success of
any change effort includes an evaluation of the intrinsic and
extrinsic rewards resulting from the change effort. In a
public sector organization such as the Navy Medical
Department, personal extrinsic rewards are limited; however,
an overall improvement in the quantity or flow of resources,
or increased support from upper echelons can be classified as
extrinsic rewards to the organization. Intrinsic rewards can
be measured by such things as an improvement in performance,
mission clarity, and overall climate.
Therefore, this section of the survey
questionnaire requested an evaluation of 17 indicators, before
and after the change effort. The areas evaluated covered a
broad range of resource and general management
responsibilities. Three areas -- access to care, control of
Champus, and Line involvement -- were taken directly from the
BRP report. The remaining areas were drawn from opinions
expressed during interviews, and from issues addressed in the
written documentation listed in Appendix C.
Each of the indicators was classified as an
Extrinsic or Intrinsic reward to facilitate evaluation of the
change effort utilizing the Beer model. Extrinsic rewards
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were based upon some benefit accruing to the member, or his
command, from an external source. The indicators representing
extrinsic rewards are:
1. Fair share of DoD Resources.
2. Fair share of DoD Personnel.
5. Funding flow from BUMED to field activities.
8. Control of CHAMPUS
.
10. Line involvement/responsibility for the provision of
medical care.
13. Upper echelon support to field commands.
Intrinsic rewards were based upon an actual
improvement in mission performance, or increased feelings of
competence for the member or the command as a result of the
change effort. The indicators classified as intrinsic rewards
were
:
3. Quality of leadership at upper echelons and field
commands
.
4. Organizational structure for field commands and Navy
Medicine overall.
6. Access to care for beneficiaries.
7. Clarity of mission for Navy Medicine.
9. Long/short term financial planning.
11. Stability of the organizational structure of Navy
Medicine
12. Daily management of financial operations.
14. Ability of Navy Medicine to respond to internal and
external forces for change.
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15. Overall morale or climate within the Medical
Department
.
In order to minimize variations in the standard
used to evaluate the impact of the change on the Medical
Department, additional instructions were provided to the
survey respondents. Responses were to be based upon a
comparison of the two year period prior to the convening of
the BRP (1986 & 1987), with conditions in 1991. Comparisons
were to be based upon changes that occurred as a result of the




This section used three questions to solicit
qualitative input regarding the management of change in the
Medical Department. Two specific questions dealt with
mechanisms field personnel felt should be used to improve the
change process. The third question addressed the implications
of Total Quality Management for field level change efforts.
In addition, a fourth question allowed for any additional
comments the respondents wished to make regarding the 198 9
restructuring, the Medical Department, or the Survey itself.
2
. Survey Population Description
The population surveyed for this thesis was all
Financial Management Professionals of the Navy Medical
Department currently assigned as part of the medical shore
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establishment who were working for the Medical Department on
30 September 1989. For the purposes of this study, members of
this population had one of the following additional
characteristics
:
• A Medical Service Corps Officer with subspecialty code
0031 as listed on the BUPERS Fiscal Comptroller Assignment
Officer Slate of 15 June 1991, or
• A U. S. Civil Service Employee, designated as the Deputy
Comptroller or above on the BUMED Financial and Logistics
Points of Contact List of February 1989.
Of the 175 officers listed in the BUPERS database, 25
were eliminated from the survey population because they were
assigned to stations outside the Medical Department, were
assigned to deployed units, or were in unidentified outservice
education programs. With the inclusion of 15 Civil Service
Employees, the total population surveyed numbered 165. The
breakdown of the population by rank and type of duty station
can be seen in Table I
.
The total response rate for the survey was 69.1%,
based upon 114 returned surveys. However, five of these were
returned as undeliverable, and another two were from
individuals who were not assigned to the Medical Department on
30 September 1989. Therefore, the response rate given the 107
useable surveys was 64.8%. A breakdown of the usable survey
responses by rank and type of duty station can be seen in
Table II.
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TABLE I SURVEY POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
06 05 04 03 02 01 GS TOTAL
BUMED 1 1 5 7 3 17
HSO 2 2 2 2 8
MTF 2 4 14 47 4 1 9 81
DTF 1 21 1 23
OTHER 1 4 9 20 1 1 36
TOTAL 6 11 31 95 6 1 15 165
TABLE I I
:
SURVEY RESPONSES (# SENT/# RETURN/% RETURN]
06-04 03-01 GS TOTAL
BUMED 7/ 6/ 86% 7/ 4/ 57% 3/ 1/ 33% 17/11/ 65%
HSO 6/ 6/100% 0/ 0/ 0% 2/ 2/100% 8/ 8/100%
MTF 20/22/110% 52/24/ 46% 9/ 4/ 44% 81/50/ 62%
DTF 1/ 0/ 0% 22/13/ 59% 0/ 0/ 0% 23/13/ 57%
OTHER 14/13/ 93% 21/12/ 57% 1/ 0/ 0% 36/25/ 69%
TOTAL 48/47/ 98% 102/53/ 52% 15/ 7/ 47% 165/107/65%
B. SURVEY DATA
Data collected from the usable surveys is summarized in
Table B-l in Appendix B. In order to evaluate if significant
subgroup differences existed, the usable responses were
stratified based upon the demographic data collected in
Section I. A description of the various strata utilized is
contained in Table III.
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TABLE III: DATA STRATIFICATION DESCRIPTION
STRATA DESCRIPTION # of RECORDS
1 All Records 107
2 04 and Above in 1989 30
2B 04 and Above in 1991 47
3 03 and Below in 1989 70
3B 03 and Below in 1991 53
4 Civil Service 7
5 At Headquarters in 1989 31
5B At Headquarters in 1991 21
6 At Headquarters in both 1989 & 1991 14
7 At Field/Other in 1989 76
7B At Field/Other in 1991 86
8 At Field/Other in both 1989 and 1991 69
9 At Field in 1989 53
9B At Field in 1991 63
10 At Field in both 1989 and 1991 43
11 Field/Other CONUS in 1989 60
12 Field/Other Out-CONUS in 1989 16
A one way analysis of variance (F-test) at the 95%
confidence level was performed comparing each subgroup (Strata
2-12) with the overall summary of the data (Stratum 1) .
These tests showed that there were no significant statistical
differences. Therefore, Stratum 1 -the total sample- will be
used as the overall basis for the discussion and analysis of
the data in Chapters V and VI.
While there were no overall group differences from the
total sample, some specific statistically significant
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differences were found when the F-test was performed comparing
senior and junior personnel, and headquarters and field
personnel. These differences will be addressed in Chapters V
and VI as appropriate.
Despite a large movement of personnel between
Headquarters, Field, and Other activities during the 1989 to
1991 period, there were no significant statistical differences
between the 1989 and 1991 strata. Therefore, all data
analysis will be based upon the assignment of personnel at the
beginning of the change effort in 1989. In addition, no
significant statistical difference was found between CONUS and
Out-Conus personnel.
A student T-Test was performed for the responses
evaluating Command and Burned Effectiveness (Section II,
Questions 8 and 9) , and the Status of the Medical Department
(Section IV) . The purpose of this test was to evaluate if the
ratings of effectiveness and status were significantly greater
or less than the midpoint of the scale. In the case of
effectiveness, this midpoint represented moderate, as opposed
to low or high, effectiveness. In the case of status, this
midpoint represented no change, as opposed to improvement or
degradation
.
Finally, the qualitative data obtained from Section V of




The results presented in this chapter come from two
sources: the survey questionnaire; and personal interviews.
Results from the survey questionnaire are divided into
quantitative and qualitative data. A summary presentation of
the both the quantitative and qualitative data from the survey
questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. Each section of the
questionnaire is discussed separately below.
The discussion of personal interviews focuses on the
answers to the five specific questions addressed during each
interview as described in Chapter IV.
B. THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE: QUANTITATIVE DATA
When viewed individually, the responses to the survey
questionnaires displayed the broad range of opinions expected
from this type of perceptual survey. Generally however, a
frequency analysis of responses to each survey question which
utilized a scale of response codes produced a normal or near
normal distribution. Therefore, where appropriate, each of
the following sections presents and discusses results for the
major sections of the survey questionnaire focusing on mean
values and their relationships.
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1 . The Reorganization Process
This section will describe the perceptions of the
respondents regarding the following: the underlying factors
behind the restructuring of the Medical Department; the
personnel responsible and communication methods used to
implement the BRP recommendations; and the effectiveness of
both BUMED and the survey respondents' commands throughout the
change process. These results will be used to assess the
change leadership as defined by the Beer model (Chapter III,
Section E)
.
By way of background well over three quarters of the
respondents had seen or read the BRP report (Section II
,
Question 6) . Less than half reported that their command in
198 9 had established a formal planning committee or group to
implement the BRP recommendations (Section II, Question 7)
.
a. Initiation of the change effort
As described in Chapter II, the restructuring of
the Medical Department was prompted by a variety of factors.
Prominent among these, according to the final report of the
BRP, were the escalating costs of CHAMPUS, diminished access
to care for beneficiaries, and the decline of Graduate Medical
Education. [Ref. 3:p. ES-1] As shown in Table IV, the
percentage of respondents who saw the first two of these
factors as one of the primary driving factors behind the
restructuring was each 47* (Section II, Question 1) . The
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(1) CHAMPUS 47 43 50 52 45 47 42 56
(2) Line
Perception
88 90 87 90 87 89 87 88
(3) GEOCOMs 44 37 46 42 45 40 47 38
(4) Defense
Budget
17 13 20 6 21 26 22 19
(5) Access to
Care
47 50 46 39 50 47 47 63
( 6 ) GME 7 13 3 16 3 4 3
factor receiving the highest percentage (88%) was the
perception by the Line of lack of control within the Medical
Department. The decline of GME was perceived as a minimal
factor (8%) driving the change effort.
As shown in Table V, the identification of who was
the prime instigator of the change effort was not as
definitive as the factors underlying the change effort
(Section II, Question 2) . As discussed in Chapter II, Section
B, the Navy IG recommended that the CNO examine the operations
of the Medical Department, whereupon the CNO convened the BRP .
When all survey responses are aggregated (stratum 1) , the CNO
and the Navy IG are the two top choices with 3~?% and 21%,
respectively. while this view clearly holds for higher
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(1) SG 15 10 19 6 18 17 22 6
(2) Fleet
CINCs
16 3 21 6 20 19 18 25
(3) MTF COs 3 1 3 3 4 3
(4) CNO 37 53 34 42 36 32 35 38
(5) Bene-
ficiaries
7 3 9 6 7 6 7 6
(6) Navy IG 21 30 13 32 16 21 13 25
ranking and headquarters personnel (strata 2 and 5) , for all
other strata, the role of the Navy IG diminishes in favor of
the Surgeon General and the Fleet CINCs. It should also be
noted, however, that in the other strata difference between
the second, third, and fourth choices is only a few percentage
points. These data suggest that higher ranking, as well as
headquarters personnel, have more definitive opinions
resulting from increased access to higher level decision
making centers and documentation that identified the roles of
the IG and the CNO. Without this information, respondents
located away from the headquarters of lower rank were more
likely to identify the CINCs or the SG.
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b. Implementation Methods
The implementation of the BRP recommendations and
the daily management of the POA&M (Section II, Question 3) was
the task of the BUMED Transition Team (Chapter II, Section D) .
The data resulting from this question are shown in Table VI.
Overall (Stratum 1) , the survey respondents felt that this
responsibility fell primarily to the Surgeon General (31%) .
As the senior officer of the Medical Department, and the
Commander of BUMED, the Transition Team worked directly for
the Surgeon General, therefore, some respondents may have
interpreted this survey question as one of ultimate
responsibility vice daily responsibility. Headquarters
TABLE VI: RESPONSIBILITY FOR POA&M MANAGEMENT
"
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(1) SG 31 40 29 26 33 32 27 56
(2) Fleet
Cincs
6 3 7 3 7 8 5 13
(3) MTF COs 12 7 14 3 16 21 17 13
(4) MED-01 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
(5) MATs 9 10 10 13 8 8 10
( 6 ) BUMED
Team
18 23 14 29 13 13 13 13
(7) BRF jj 15 1? 14 1 ? 13 11 17
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personnel (Stratum 5) were the only stratification which
selected the transition team (29%) over the Surgeon General
(26%) . Field/Other personnel (Stratum 7) selected the SG
(33%) , and then the MTF Commanders (16%) , over the transition
team (13%) . Personnel Out-CONUS (Stratum 12) , overwhelmingly
selected the SG (56%) , and ranked the MTF Commanders (13%)
,
and the Fleet Commanders (13%) , on a par with the transition
team (13%) . It seems clear, therefore, that a greater
distance from the headquarters, diminished the visibility of
the transition team.
A wide variety of methods were used by respondents
to obtain information regarding the restructuring of the
Medical Department (Section II, Questions 4 and 5) . As shown
in Table VII, the two methods which were used most widely, and
were perceived as being the most valuable, were formal written
communications (74%/32%) 1 and personal contacts (64%/30%)
.
There were no significant variations in the precedence of the
methods across the various strata. However, higher ranking
(Stratum 2) and headquarters personnel (Stratum 5) found
greater value (40% and 52%, respectively) in personal contacts
than other personnel who selected these information sources as
the most valuable with a range frequency of 19% to 24%.
1 Throughout the text and tables of this thesis, the
responses for these survey questions (Section II, Questions 4 and
5) are shown as the percentage of respondents who reported using
the communication method followed by the percentage who found it
the most valuable method (% used/% most valuable)
.
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(1) Media 30/6 37/7 30/6 29/10 30/4 30/2 25/2 50/13
(2) BUMED
Roadshow
27/8 27/10 26/7 26/3 28/11 28/13 30/10 19/13
(3) Personal
Contacts
64/30 80/40 57/24 90/52 54/21 47/19 53/22 56/19
(4) MAT Visit 17/3 17/3 19/3 10/0 20/4 23/6 23/5 6/0
(5) Written
Commun
74/32 80/27 74/36 65/13 78/39 77/38 78/38 75/44
(6) Internal
Brief
48/21 57/10 44/19 48/29 47/17 53/21 38/20 44/6
c. Effectiveness of the Change Leadership
This portion of the survey questionnaire requested
an evaluation of the effectiveness of both BUMED and the
respondent's 1989 command in implementing the recommendations
of the BRP (Section II, Questions 8 and 9) . The scale
established was from 1 through 7, with 1 representing low
effectiveness and 7 representing high effectiveness. The
midpoint of the scale, therefore was 4.0.
The data for this section of the survey are shown
in Table VIII. The first column presents the means, standard
deviations, and value of N for the total sample (Stratum 1)
,
while the second column presents the same information for the
Headquarters personnel (Stratum 5) . Looking at column 1, the
effectiveness of the commands was iudoed to be better than
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Sample Size = 27
N"'/Mean/SD
Command Effectiveness
Determining Objectives 89 / 4.3 / 1.72 27 / 5.1* / 1.44
Communicating Objectives 88 / 4.0 / 1.63 27 / 4.4 / 1.70
Implementing Objectives 88 / 4.1 / 1.50 28 / 4.7* / 1.47
BUMED Effectiveness
Communicating Factors 97 / 3.4* / 1.27 27 / 2.8* / 1.06
Setting Objectives 94 / 3.6* / 1.32 26 / 3.6 / 1.42
Communicating Objectives 94 / 3.4* / 1.29 25 / 3.1* / 1.21
Showing Commitment 95 / 3.6* / 1.37 27 / 3.6 / 1.72
Gaining Commitment 94 / 3.4* / 1.27 26 / 3.4* / 1.38
Seeking Feedback 90 / 3.0* / 1.28 24 / 3.0* / 1.45
Overall Management 96 / 3.1* / 1.16 27 / 2.8* / 1.31
Indicates mean effectiveness ratings that are significantly
different from the midpoint rating of 4 . (t >= 1.96; p <=. 05)
.
N varies for each question due to option of selecting "No Opinion"
that of BUMED in three comparable factors: a) setting/
determining the objectives; b) communicating the objectives;
and c) implementing / overall management of the change effort.
Utilizing the T-Test to evaluate the difference of the given
means from the midpoint of the scale, the commands were
perceived to be not significantly different from the midpoint
of 4.0, while the effectiveness ratings of BUMED by the total
sample were all found to be significantly less than 4.0 (t >=
1. 96, p <= .05)
.
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Interestingly, when isolated from the aggregate
totals, data from personnel at the Headquarters activities
(stratum 5) show their ratings of command effectiveness to be
higher than their ratings of BUMED effectiveness. These data
are shown in the second column of Table VIII. When analyzed
statistically using an F-Test, this stratum was significantly
different from Stratum 1 for command effectiveness, but not
for BUMED effectiveness. In addition, the T-test for this
stratum showed that the ratings of Command effectiveness was
above or at the midpoint for the three command measures, while
it was at or below the midpoint for the BUMED measures. This
apparent anomaly in the perceptions of this group may have
resulted from commands other than BUMED, such as the GEOCOMs,
and OP-093, being included in the Headquarters stratum.
The effectiveness of BUMED was evaluated on seven
factors. While acknowledging that all ratings are below 4.0,
there are differences in the sample ratings of BUMED''
s
effectiveness. The two aspects with the highest ratings were
setting objectives and demonstrating commitment to the
objectives each with a mean of 3.6. In contrast BUMED was
less effective at seeking feedback, and the overall management




2 . Objectives of the Reorganization
The discussion in this section focuses on the
importance and the achievement of specific objectives and is
based upon the data presented in Table IX derived from
responses to Section III of the survey questionnaire.
As discussed in Chapter IV, Section Al, the objectives
evaluated were drawn from three sources. These were: a) The
BRP final report; b) personal interviews; and c) management
literature. In all, 16 objectives were presented for
evaluation on a seven point scale similar to that used for
evaluating the implementation effectiveness of BUMED . Table
V lists the objectives, their source, the mean ratings for
both importance and achievement, as well as the relative
ranking of the objectives in importance and achievement.
When ranked from the most to the least important, five
objectives appeared at the top of the list using the total
sample. These were:
1. Transfer professional expertise to the MTF's (X = 4 . 6) .




Improve communication _and coordination by shortening
the Chain-of-Command (X = 4.4)
.
6. Shield Navy Medicine from overall defense budget cuts
(X = 4.6)
.
16. Control/reduce CHAMFUS Costs (X = 4.4).
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1 . Pers shift BRP
Report





100/ 4.5 /1.71 4 97/ 3.6 /1.40 8
3. Centralize Liter-
ature






























102/ 4.0 /1.89 12 101/ 3.0 /1.39 14
10 . MAT Visits BRP
Report





102/ 4.2 /2.01 7 100/ 3.9 /1.88 3
12 . Planning Liter-
ature
100/ 4.0 /1.73 13 98/ 3.0 /1.36 12
13 . Creativity Liter-
ature










103/ 4.2 /1.73 6 100/ 3.0 /1.38 11
16 . CHAMPUS BRP
Report
101/ 4.7 /2.03 1 98/ 2.7 /1.28 16
* N varies for each question due to option of selecting "No Opinion"
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Across the various strata there was only one
statistical difference from the above list. Headquarters
personnel, (stratum 5) , did not include objective 6 as one of
the top five objectives. Instead, Objective 8, "Enhance the
Command/Control of the SG" (mean = 4.1), was in the top five
list
.
Three of the top five objectives were drawn from the
final report of the BRP . These were objectives 1, 4, and 16.
Of the five additional objectives drawn from the report, two
were ranked in the middle third, while three ended up near the
bottom of the list. Included in the bottom third of the list
was objective 7, "Make GME Navy Medicine's #1 priority",
objective 9, "Make the Line responsible for the provision of
medical care", both with means of 4.0, and objective 10,
"Create a structure for ongoing Management Assist Visits from
upper echelons" with a mean of 3.5.
Ranking the objectives based upon perceived level of
achievement produces a list markedly different than when
ranked upon perceived importance. Based upon the aggregation
of all records, (there were no significant statistical
variations for any subsample) , the top five objectives for
achievement are as follows:
3. Centralize Authority /operations at BUMED/HSOs (X =
4.0).




7. Make GME Navy Medicine's #1 priority (X = 4.0).
8. Enhance the command/control of the SG (X = 3.7) .
11. Increase budget flexibility at the MTF's by the removal
of SAG restrictions (X = 3.9)
.
The composition of this list brings to light several
significant differences between perceived importance and
achievement. First, only objective 6, shielding the budget,
is common to the two top five lists. In addition, two of the
remaining four objectives on the achievement list, ranked in
the bottom third in importance. Conversely, two of the top
five objectives in importance, rank in the bottom third in
achievement. These two findings suggest either limited
attention has been placed on implementing important
objectives, or that the more important the objective, the more
difficult it is to achieve. Third, it is interesting to note
that while decentralization was overwhelmingly perceived as
more important than centralization, the opposite is true for
achievement where it was perceived that more centralization
than decentralization has been achieved.
3
.
Comparative Status of the Medical Department
As discussed in Chapter IV, section Al, the purpose of
this portion of the survey questionnaire was to obtain an
evaluation of the perceived status of the Medical Department
based upon a list of management indicators. Respondents were
requested to evaluate the status of each indicator today,
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compared with the two year period prior to the convening of
the BRP . Again a scale of 1 - 7 was utilized. In this case
a score of 7 indicated the respondent thought the Medical
Department was better off, while a score of 1 indicated the
Medical Department was worse off. The midpoint of the scale,
4.0, indicated that no change in status had occurred.
The results for this section of the survey are shown
in Table X. To statistically evaluate the data, all means
were compared with the midpoint on the scale (4.0), which
represented no change in status, using a student's T-Test.
Only two factors (1 and 4b) showed a statistically significant
increase in status. Specifically these were "receiving a fair
share of DoD resources" and the "leadership quality at field
activities .
"
Four factors ( 4a, 8, 9, and 11) showed a statistically
significant decrease. Factors 4a and 8, "Organizational
Structure of Navy Medicine" and the stability of that
structure, are particularly noteworthy since they reflect
directly on the primary strategy of the change effort. In
addition, the decrease of factor 8, "Control of CHAMPUS", also
demonstrates a perceived lack of success of the change effort
at addressing one of the primary underlying factors which
respondents perceived to be the cause of the change effort
.
All of the remaining factors evaluated were rated as
unchanged. Included in this group was another of the primary
driving forces respondents perceived to be the cause of the
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TABLE X: COMPARATIVE STATUS OF THE NAVY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
Management Factor Total Sample
Sample Size = 107
N**/Mean/SD
1 . Share of DoD Resources 93 / 4.5* / 1.20
2 . Share of DoD Personnel 93 / 4.2 / 1.24
3 . Leadership Quality
(a) Upper Echelon 97 / 4.1 / 1.16
(b) Field Commands 95 / 4.3* / 1.15
4. Organization Structure
(a) Navy Medicine 96 / 3.7* / 1.33
(b) Field Commands 97 / 3.9 / 1.27
5. Funding Flow to Field 96 / 3.9 / 1.40
6. Access to Care 95 / 4.1 / 1.06
7. Clarity of Mission 96 / 4.0 / 1.22
8. Control of CHAMP US 96 / 3.4* / 1.29
9. LT/ST Fin Planning 95 / 3.7* / 1.38
10. Line Responsibility 95 / 4.2 / 1.31
11. Org Stability 95 / 3.4* / 1.28
12. Daily Management 97 / 4.0 / 1.24
13. Upper Echelon Support 97 / 3.8 / 1.23
14. Change Response 98 / 3.8 / 1.28
15. Overall climate 98 / 3.9 / 1.35
* Indicates mean status ratings that are
significantly different from the midpoint
rating of 4.0 (t >= 1.96, p <= .05).
** N varies due to option of selecting "No Opinion"
change effort, "Access to care for beneficiaries", and one of
the major restructuring strategies, "Line involvement and
responsibility for the provision of medical care". In
addition, the ability of Navy Medicine to respond to future
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change efforts (factor 14) , and the overall climate of the
Medical Department (factor 15) , also were rated unchanged.
In this section of the survey there were some
significant statistical differences between the strata (Table
XI) . Senior and junior personnel (strata 2 & 3) differed on
the status of three indicators (4a, 11, and 13) . These were:
"Organizational Structure of Navy Medicine"; "Stability of the
Organizational Structure"; and "Upper Echelon Support to Field
Commands". In all three cases, senior personnel perceived a
decrease in status, while junior personnel felt that these
indicators remained the same. In addition, Headquarters
personnel, (stratum 5) , perceived a decrease in indicator 4A
and 11, while Field personnel (stratum 9) felt that these
indicators remained the same. Taken together, these two






















Upper Echelons 27/ 3.1* /1.12 62/ 4.1 /1.24 29/ 3.2* /1.40 46/ 3.9 /1.29
11 . Structural
stability 28/ 2.9* /1.31 60/ 3.8 /1.16 30/ 2.9* /1.35 44/ 3.67 /1.25
13 . Support to
Field from
Upper Echelons
27/ 3.3* /l .59 63/ 4.0 /l. 01 29/ 3.6 /1.52 47/ 3.9 /1.18
* Indicates mean status ratinas that are siani f i-rantly different from the midpoint
rating of 4 . (t>= 3 - = n<; i
** N varies due to option to select "No Opinion"
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variations between the strata seem to indicate a greater
degree of pessimism regarding the restructuring strategy of
the change effort from higher ranking personnel and those more
central to the implementation process. One possible
explanation for this finding is that more senior personnel
have personal experiences with the earlier, and unsuccessful,
Medical Department restructurings, which are unfavorably
coloring their view of the 1989 effort. While there is some
evidence to support this explanation in the form of specific
statements in the qualitative portion of the survey
questionnaire, any conclusions based upon this evidence would
be highly speculative.
C. THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE: QUALITATIVE DATA
Qualitative data was requested regarding the management of
change in the Medical Department. Two specific questions
dealt with mechanisms which should be used to improve the
change management process. A third question addressed the
integration of Total Quality Leadership (TQL) into field level
change efforts. A final question allowed for any additional
comments the respondents wished to make regarding the 198 9
restructuring, the Medical Department, or the Survey itself.
The specific survey questions can be found in Appendix A.
Overall, 70% of the respondents answered one or more of
the first three questions, while 30% provided additional
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comments . A summary of the responses for questions 1-3 can
be found in Appendix B, Tables B-2 through B-4.
Question 1 centered on the best method for field personnel
to provide input to the change process. Most respondents
interpreted this question from a purely communications
standpoint. A variety of communications techniques were
proposed including: Annual Financial Management Conferences;
Point Papers; and Electronic Mail. A generic requirement for
open lines of communication was mentioned by 16% of the survey
respondents answering the question.
Several respondents also suggested process changes
including: field participation on the IG Team; a separate
BUMED Division, staffed by field representatives, for the
centralized control of communications between the field and
BUMED; and reestablishment of the GEOCOMs
.
Question 2 focused on TQL and the change process for field
activities. Interestingly, the two most frequent responses
are contradictory. Adopting TQL as a "way-of-life" was
mentioned 11 times, while the sentiment that TQL will never
work in the Medical Department was mentioned 10 times. This
second sentiment was augmented by an additional 9 comments
that TQL will never work for the field activities until it is
fully embraced and practiced by BUMED itself.
Question 3 requested specific mechanisms or processes the
Medical Department should utilize to face future forces for
change. This question provoked the widest range of responses
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of any of the four questions in this section. Again, like
question 1, many of the responses focused on communication
issues. In addition, 10% of the answers suggested eliminating
BUMED from the change process by enhancing the connection
between field activities, and the Line Navy.
Other comments provided in response to question 4 focused
primarily on amplifications of answers to other questions,
generalized comments on the restructuring as a whole, or on
the survey itself. Where appropriate, these comments have
been incorporated into Tables B-2 through B-4. In addition,
four people, although carrying a Financial Management
subspecialty code, stated that they felt they were either
unqualified to respond to the survey questions, or had little
or no knowledge of the 198 9 restructuring even though they had
financial management positions during the target period.
D. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS
As discussed in Chapter IV, Section A, the purpose of the
personal interviews was primarily to clarify content and
interpretations of written references, identify objectives,
and obtain additional insights for the preparation of the
survey questionnaire. The personnel interviewed included
members of the BRP Organization and Management Task Force,
senior personnel in MED-01, a member of the Burned Transition
Team, as well as members from the MAT and P.IT teams.
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The interviews were unstructured, focusing instead on the
member's area of expert knowledge regarding the change effort.
However, the following specific questions were addressed
during each interview.
1. What were the objectives of the restructuring?
2. What was your role in the change effort?
3. Who do you feel was the primary driving force which
initiated the change process?
4. Do you feel this change effort was an attempt by the
Line Navy to seize control of the Medical Department?
5. Is the restructuring going to solve the long standing
problems of the Medical Department (ie: CHAMPUS, access
to care)
?
The interviews provoked one of two responses to question
1 . Either the interviewee referred to the final report of the
BRP for a list of objectives, or it was stated that the
restructuring had no objectives. From these two positions
additional probing usually revealed additional objectives not
formally stated in the BRP report. Three of these were
included in the survey questionnaire and are described in
Chapter IV. Other opinions in response to this question were
used to frame the management indicators utilized in Section IV
of the survey questionnaire.
In response to question 3, all interviewees referred to
either the memorandum of the Navy IG [Ref: 2], or selected the
CNO as the prime instigator of the change effort. In addition
all interviewees felt the change effort was initiated in
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response to pressures from the Line and Beneficiaries to
improve access to care, and reduce CHAMPUS costs. Over half
of the interviewees also listed the apparent lack of command
and control by the Surgeon General as a major force behind the
change effort.
Only one member felt that the restructuring was a direct
attempt by the Line to gain control of the Medical Department.
A majority of the remaining members felt that the Line did not
want control of Navy Medicine and opposed the restructuring
and the resulting dual chain-of-command.
Most interviewees felt that it was too early to fully
determine the impact of the restructuring on the long standing
problems of the Medical Department (CHAMPUS, Access to care,
etc.) . However, several members felt that the restructuring
was not directed at the true underlying causes of the Medical
Department's problems such as quantity of resources and lack
of clarity of mission, but rather, as with earlier
reorganizations, attempted to treat symptoms of the basic
causes, such as command and control and communication issues,
through structural remedies. As a result, they felt that the
198 9 restructuring will ultimately fail. In support of this
position, these members pointed to the ongoing controversy
regarding the new chain-of-command and continuing efforts to
evaluate the role of the RLC's and the HSO' s [Ref. 5].
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VI . CONCLUSIONS
A. EVALUATING THE 1989 RESTRUCTURING
As Beckhard warns there are many pitfalls which can entrap
the unwary evaluator [Ref . 15] . These include the timing of
the study and the sources of the information upon which the
evaluation is based. In addition, the confines of the
evaluation must be clearly stated at the outset. This thesis
uses the change management and evaluation models described in
Chapter III to evaluate the success of the 1989 restructuring
of the Navy Medical Department from the perspective of the
Financial Management professionals of the Department.
While the use of these models will fulfill the
requirements of the primary thesis research question, it must
be noted that the change effort being evaluated is not yet
complete. Some interviewees and survey respondents expressed
this concern, and in fact, pointed out that any evaluation
based upon achieving specific objectives is premature.
However, the history of the Medical Department reveals that
the time span between major reorganizations is decreasing, and
documentation reviewed during background research revealed
that formal management initiatives have already begun to
refine or reverse many of the restructuring initiatives of
198 9 [Ref 5] . Therefore, the conclusions presented in this
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chapter will focus on specific measures of success or
failures, and how these can influence future change efforts.
It must also be noted that although the Financial
Management community is a central part of the management of
Navy Medicine, it is by no means the definitive component.
This population was selected, however, because many of the
problems facing Navy Medicine today are resource related
issues. Therefore, any action taken to address those
problems, must to a large degree, be facilitated by the
actions of the resource managers.
B. CHANGE MODELS
1 . The Griffin and Curzon Models
As discussed in Chapter III, and illustrated in
Figures 4 and 5, Griffin and Curzon provide a sequence of
steps for the management of a change effort. Both conclude
that a well defined process must be followed or the
probability of successfully implementing the change will be
low.
In both models, the Blue Ribbon Panel fulfills the
requirement for a well defined change process. However, the
BRP was only tasked with completing the first few steps in
either model.
In the case of Griffin's model, the BRP completed the
first four steps: Recognizor-! the need for change;
Establishing goals for the change; Diagnosing the relevant
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variables; and Selecting the appropriate change techniques.
The remaining steps were all tasked to BUMED and were managed
by the transition team.
Curzon' s model is somewhat harder to interpret for a
large scale change effort, but again, the BRP appears to have
been tasked with about half of the defined steps. The first
three steps, conceptualizing the change, preparing the
organization for change, and organizing the planners of the
change seem to lie fully within the scope of the BRP. The
next two steps, planning the change, and formulating the
decision making process seemed to be shared responsibilities
with BUMED. The remaining steps were tasked fully to BUMED.
2 . The Beckhard Model
Beckhard describes the Total System Performance Review
as the comparison of stated organizational goals and
objectives with change outcomes. In order to perform this
comparison, Beckhard assumes that a clearly stated set of
objectives was prepared prior to the initiation of the change
effort
.
As discussed in Chapter III, this development of
objectives, or a vision of success for the new organization,
is one of the first critical steps for managing change
successfully. However, personal interviews with principle
change agents and personnel at Headquarters activities
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revealed that no specific list of objectives was prepared for
this change effort.
The BRP report, while listing numerous recommendations
for specific management actions, only cited three major goals
of the reorganization. These were to reduce the use and cost
of CHAMPUS, increase access to care, and make GME Navy
Medicines #1 priority. In all three cases, these objectives
failed to meet the criteria established by Hitt, Middlemist,
and Mathias that an objective must have a precise and
measurable result
.
Although the survey respondents clearly shared the
view that the control of CHAMPUS was a driving force behind
the change, and that it was a top objective of the
restructuring, the importance of GME was not clearly
communicated to the survey population. This is evidenced by
the low ranking the GME objective was given by the survey
respondents
.
According to Beckhard, and the other change management
models cited (i.e., Griffin, Curzon) , this lack of emphasis on
the creation and communication of objectives was a major
failing in this change effort. As a result, the determination
of objectives was left to the personal interpretation of the
implementation teams and the target population. As shown by
the survey data, although there was a strong agreement on the
importance and achievement of objectives, there was not
necessarily congruence between the goals as perceived and the
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goals and recommendations as stated by the BRP . This resulted
in the perceived importance of objectives not addressed by the
BRP, and the achievement of objectives not central to the
success of the change effort.
In addition to the achievement of specific objectives,
the Beckhard model also requires an evaluation of the current
attitudes of the personnel impacted by the change regarding
the current condition of the organization. As demonstrated by
Section IV of the survey questionnaire, for nearly all
management indicators, the survey population feels the Medical
Department is no better off than it was before the change
effort was begun.
Based upon the lack of congruence between the
respondents' perceived objectives and the BRP's stated goals,
and the lack of measurable performance improvements, the
Beckhard model suggests that the 198 9 restructuring was not
successful
.
3 . The Beer Model
This model, discussed in Chapter III, focuses on the
change leadership, and on intrinsic and extrinsic rewards in
evaluating the change effort. Unlike the Beckhard model, Beer
states that what may be more important than the achievement of
specific objectives are feelings of success as a result of the
change. These affective responses can lead to increased
competence and reinforcement of now behavior. [Ref 9]
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The Beer model begins with an evaluation of the
leadership of the organization during the change effort. Beer
states that the leadership must demonstrate commitment, seek
feedback, and generally support the change effort if it is to
be successfully implemented by other members of the
organization
.
The survey population clearly felt that BUMED was, at
best, only moderately effective at managing the change process
as demonstrated in Section II of the questionnaire. The
reported data could be the result, however, of a number of
alternative explanations.
The first alternative explanation is that there is a
general feeling of disdain for BUMED. The qualitative data
generated by Section V of the survey show a broad based
antipathy directed at BUMED, and that there were wide
divisions between field and Headquarters personnel. This
could account for a general tendency to rank BUMED
effectiveness low.
A second alternative explanation is that there are
major communications problems in the Medical Department. The
qualitative data also indicate that respondents perceived
revised or enhanced communications procedures as principle
methods to improve the change process. Since most of the
BUMED effectiveness factors were contingent upon communication
between BUMED and the Field commands, perceived communication
problems would result in lower effectiveness ratings.
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A third alternative explanation is that BUMED'
s
effectiveness at leading the implementation effort really was
poor. This could be due to the restraints placed upon BUMED
by the BRP, the implementation methods chosen, or the lack of
time and personnel resources to fully plan and carry out a
successful implementation strategy.
Regardless of whether one, some, or all of the above
explanations are judged to be correct, the Beer model would
suggest that the organization leadership during the change
effort has not been successful. If successful change
leadership had occurred, the general antipathy directed at
BUMED, and the related communications problems, might have
been neutralized, and hence resulted in higher effectiveness
ratings across the seven measures utilized.
The second portion of the Beer model is a measure of
the intrinsic and extrinsic rewards which accrued as a result
of the change effort. As discussed in Chapter IV, the
extrinsic rewards, as defined by Beer, available to public
sector employees, particularly military members, are limited.
However, such things as an increased flow of resources, or an
increase in support from upper echelons to an organization,
could be viewed as an extrinsic reward to the organization.
These factors were measured in Section IV of the survey. One
extrinsic reward, the share of DoP resources allocated to Navy
Medicine, had clearly improved in the view of the survey
population. This was balanced however, by a decrease in
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another extrinsic reward, the control of CHAMPUS
.
Intrinsically, all factors, with the exception of quality of
command leadership, either remained the same, or decreased.
The picture that is painted with the Beer model, then,
is a change effort that has been largely unsuccessful due to
the perceived ineffectiveness of the change leadership, and
the perceived lack of rewards resulting from the change
process
.
4 . A Summary Evaluation
When taken together, the Beckhard and the Beer models
provide an overall evaluation based on three criterion. These
are: 1) the comparison of stated objectives and perceived
outcomes; 2) the effectiveness of the change leadership; and
3) the perceived change in the organization's performance as
measured by the members feelings regarding the organization
and the rewards accrued during the change effort. As
discussed above, the restructuring of the Medical Department
has been unsuccessful based upon all of these criterion as
perceived by the Financial Management professionals within
Navy Medicine.
Within the framework of the Griffin and Curzon models
it seems clear, therefore, that the change process was
disrupted at some point since the outcomes established, or
conceptualized at the beginning of the process, were not the
same as the perceived results. This study was not designed to
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specifically evaluate each step as defined by Griffin and
Curzon. However, the BRP process did produce a set of
recommendations and the framework of a new organizational
structure in the final report of November 1988. In addition,
BUMED did create a specific implementation plan which was
initiated from May 198 9 until the present. The breakdown in
the process, then, appears to be the result of decisions that
were made after the BRP report was completed and prior to the
formal restructuring on 1 October 1989. A more definitive
study which formally evaluates the steps in the change process
is required to fully delineate the extent to which this change
effort departed from the Griffin and Curzon models.
There are elements of success, however, within the
scope of the change models utilized. Although there was a
breakdown in the development and communication of objectives
from the BRP to the Field activities as measured within the
Beckhard model, a consensus on the importance of specific
issues, such as CHAMPUS was achieved. In addition, while most
members saw very little improvement in the status of the
Medical Department as a result of the change, there was a very
positive feeling that the resources of Navy Medicine were
being protected from the overall defense budget cuts as a
result of the restructuring. Members at field activities also
saw an improvement in the quality of leadership of their
commands. It is possible that these elements of success,
could be the crucible for a future successful change effort.
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C. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY FOR FUTURE CHANGE EFFORTS
What emerges from this study is that there is a broad
consensus, within the Financial Management community of what
is and is not important to the future of Navy Medicine, and
that the restructuring of the Medical Department has not been
successful at addressing the basic underlying problems of the
Medical Department. What emerged from the Blue Ribbon Panel
process, therefore, was a top down statement of strategic
purpose, which was not fully embraced during the
implementation process due to a failure in the communications
between the strategic planners, the upper level implementors,
and the field activities.
The results of this study indicate that major revisions in
the strategic development and implementation of change are
required. First, a clear set of objectives or vision of
success must be established by the change leadership directed
toward solving the basic underlying problems of the Medical
Department. Second, once developed, those objectives must be
widely disseminated and used as the basis for both
Headquarters and Field level implementation strategies.
Third, for system wide changes, Field level personnel must be
brought into the change process at the very beginning, and
must remain in the process until the implementation phase is
completed. This would enhance the commitment of the Field
personnel to the change process, and help clarify and define
the rewards accruing from the change effort. Taken together,
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these revisions increase the likelihood of a successful
implementation
.
The data collected in this study show that despite a
massive restructuring, and the consumption of resources, the
Medical Department is, overall, no better off today than prior
to this change effort. However, as measured by the Beckhard
and Beer models, the quantitative margin between the apparent
failure of the restructuring and potential success is small.
Had the revisions discussed above been included in this change
effort, the two models might have reported success instead of
failure
.
Finally, the BRP was the third major effort in the last 20
years to address the underlying problems of the Medical
Department through structural changes. While the BRP report
is not limited strictly to structural recommendations, an
enormous amount of energy was directed at structural
solutions. What is clear from the results of this study, is
that it is time for Navy strategic planners to look beyond
structural changes as the solutions to major strategic issues.
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APPENDIX A. THESIS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
SECTION I Background Information:
1. How many years have you been in Government Service?
2. How many years have you been a Navy Financial Manager?




30 Sep 198 9
04 and Above
(2) 03 and Below
(3) GS-12 and Above




















6. Were you Out-CONUS in 1989? Are you Out-CONUS now?
SECTION II The Reorganization Process:
1 . From the choices given, which do you feel were the primary underlying factors which








Line perception of lack of control within Navy Medicine
Dysfunctional Operation of the GEOCOM'
s
Overall decline in the Defense Budget
Diminished access to medical care for beneficiaries
Declining Graduate Medical Education





The Surgeon General (4)
The Fleet Commanders (5)
The MTF Commanders (6)
The Chief of Naval Operations
The Beneficiary Population
The Navy Inspector General
3. Who had the daily responsibility for the development and implementation of the plan of





The Surgeon General (5)
The Fleet Commanders (6)
The MTF Commanders (7)
MED-01
The Management Assist Teams
The Burned Transition Team
The Blue Ribbon Panel itself
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4. From the list below, indicate how you obtained or received information regarding the
reorganization, (select as many as appropriate)
(1) Media (4) Management Assist Team Visit
(2) ^^ NAVMEDCOM Roadshow (5)
"
(3) Personal Contacts (6)
Official Written Communications
Internal Command Briefings
5. Which single method above was the most valuable for you?
6. Have you seen/read the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations (Y/N)
?
7. Did your command in 1989 have/establish a committee, task force, or other planning
group to implement the reorganization (Y/N) ?





5 4 3 2 1
No
Opinion
(1) Determining the reorganization's
objectives for Navy Medicine.
(2) Communicating those objectives
within your command.




9. How effective was BUMED at the following: (Mark the scale with an "X")
Very
7 6
(1) Communicating the underlying factors
driving the reorganization.
(2) Setting the reorganization's objectives
for Navy Medicine.
(3) Communicating those objectives to the
field activities.
(4) Showing commitment to the objectives.
(5) Gaining commitment for the objectives
from field activities and the Line.
(6) Seeking feedback from the field
activities and the Line.





5 4 3 2 1
SECTION III. Objectives of the Reorganization:
Part A: Below is a list of possible objectives. Indicate how important you feel these











1. Transfer professional expertise to MTF's.
2. Decentralize Authority/Operations to MTF's.
3. Centralize Authority/Operations
at BUMED/HSO's.
4. Improve communication and coordination
by shortening the Chain-of-Command.
5. Standardize internal organizational
structure/operations of Field Commands.
6. Shield Navy Medicine from overall
Defense budget reductions.
7. Make GME the Navy Medicine's #1 priority.
8. Enhance the command/control of the
Surgeon General
.
9. Make the Line responsible for the
provision of medical care.
10. Create a structure for ongoing Management
Assist Visits from upper echelons.
11. Increase budget flexibility at the MTF's
by the removal of SAG restrictions.
12. Establish formal mechanisms at all
commands for planning/managing change.
13. Stimulate creative management thinking
and innovative practices.
14. Minimize reorganization's impact on daily
financial operations at field commands.
15. Standardize long and short range
financial planning and reporting.
16. Control/reduce CHAMPUS costs.
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Below is the same list of objectives presented above. Indicate how well thePart B:
objectives have been achieved to date.




5 4 3 2 1
1. Transfer professional expertise to MTF's.
2. Decentralize Authority/Operations to MTF's.
3. Centralize Authority/Operations
at BUMED/HSO's.
4. Improve communication and coordination
by shortening the Chain-of-Command.
5. Standardize internal organizational
structure/operations of Field Commands.
6. Shield Navy Medicine from overall
Defense budget reductions.
7. Make GME the Navy Medicine's #1 priority.
8
.
Enhance the command/ control of the
Surgeon General
.
9. Make the Line responsible for the
provision of medical care.
10. Create a structure for ongoing Management
Assist Visits from upper echelons
11. Increase budget flexibility at the MTF's
by the removal of SAG restrictions.
12. Establish formal mechanisms at all
commands for planning/managing change.
13. Stimulate creative management thinking
and innovative practices
.
14. Minimize reorganization's impact on daily
financial operations at field commands.
15. Standardize long and short range
financial planning and reporting.
16. Control/reduce CHAMPUS costs.
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SECTION IV Comparative Status of the Medical Department
:
For each of the following areas, indicate how you view the Navy Medical Department
today in comparison to the two year period (1986 £ 1987) prior to the convening of the
Blue Ribbon Panel. Make your comparison based upon changes that occurred as a result of
the reorganization, and not some other concurrent management initiative. (Mark scale with
an "X")
AREA
1. Fair share of DOD Resources.
2. Fair share of DOD Personnel.
3. Quality of Leadership:
a. at upper echelons
b. at the Field Commands
4. Organizational Structure
a. of Navy Medicine
b. of the Field Commands
5. Funding Flow from BUMED to the field.
6. Access to care for beneficiaries.
7. Clarity of mission for Navy Medicine.
8. Control of CHAMPUS
.
9. Long/short-range Financial Planning.
10. Line involvement/responsibility for the
provision of medical care.
11
.
Stability of the organizational
structure of Navy Medicine.
12. Daily management of financial operations.
13. Upper echelon support to field commands.
14. Ability of Navy Medicine to respond to
internal/external forces for change.













SECTION V Narrative input:
This section gives you is an opportunity to provide other information, you feel
would be valuable when analyzing the 1989 reorganization from the perspective of the
financial community.
Briefly answer the following: (attach additional sheets if required)
(1) How do you feel field level personnel can best provide input for managing change
efforts to upper echelons?
(2) How do you feel field level TQL programs can be integrated into the change process?
(3) What mechanisms /processes should Navy Medicine utilize/develop to address future
internal/external forces for change?
(4) Other Comments:
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APPENDIX B. DATA TABLES
This appendix contains summary data tables of surveys
which meet the following criteria:
• Surveys were returned by Financial Management
Professionals who were working for the Navy Medical
Department on 30 September 1989.




The format for this table follows a condensed version of
the survey questionnaire. The full questions upon which the
tables are based can be found in Appendix A.
All averages were computed disregarding responses of 'No
Opinion'
. The total number of surveys used to calculate the
average is given to the left of the average itself.
B. Tables B-2 through B-4
These tables present a summary of the responses for the
narrative questions in Section V of the survey questionnaire.
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TABLE B-l: SURVEY RESULTS: ALL RECORDS
Records in Strata: 107
SECTION I
:
1. AVG YEARS OF SERVICE: 16.9
4. RANK IN 1989: 04 and above
:
RANK IN 1991: 04 and above
AVG YEARS AS NAVY TIN MGP
:
3. TOTAL IN NAVMED 1989: 100*
28% 03 and below: 65% GS-12 and above: 6% GS-11 and below: 1*
44% 03 and below: 50% GS-12 and above: 7% GS-11 and below: 0%
5. DUTY STATION IN 1989: NAVMEDCOM: 17% GEOCOM: 12% MTF : 36% DTF : 13% Other: 21% Out-CONUS: 16%
DUTY STATION IN 1991: BUMED: 12% HSO: 7% MTF: 47% DTF: 12% Other: 21% Out-CONUS: 19%
SECTION II:







47% CHAMFUS 15% SG '] SG 30%/ 6%
88% LINE FEPCEFTIONS 16% FLEET CMDRS 6% FLEET CMDRS 27%/ 8%
44» GEOCOM OFEFATION 3% MTF CMDRS 12% MTF CMDRS 64%/ 30%
17% DOD BUDGET 37% CNO 3% MED-01 17%/ 3%
47% ACCESS TO CAPE 7% BENEFICIARIES 9% MAT TEAMS 74%/ 32%





6. TOTAL READ/SEEN BRF REPORT: 84%
7. TOTAL WITH FORMAL CHANGE COMMITTEE: 40%














(7) OVERALL CHANGE EFFORT:
97 / 3 I





94 / 3 4
90 3




















* / ftVC * / AVG
96 / 4. 6 J 4 / 3. 6
100 / 4 . 5 97 / 3. 6
101 / 3. ( 95 / 4 .
103 / 4. 4 101 / 2.9
102 / 4.1 99 / 3 .
10: / 4 . e 100 / 3 . B
100 4.0 9] / 4 .
10C / 4.2 97 / 3. 7
102 / 4.0 101 / 3.0
99 / 3.5 95 / 3.
io: / 4 . 2 100 / 3. 9
100 / 4.0 98 / 3 .
103 / 4.2 101 / 3 . 3
101 / 4.0 100 / 3.6
103 / 4.2 100 / 3.0




3A. LEADEF QUALITY UPFEP:
3B. LEADER QUALITY FIELD:
4A. ORG STRUC NAVY MED:
4B. ORG STRUC FIELD:
5. FUNDING FLOW:
6. ACCESS TO CARE:
7. MISSION CLARITY:





13. UPPER LEVEL SUPPORT:
14. RESPONSE TO CHANGE:
15. OVERALL CLIMATE:
STATUS
* / AV -,
9 ! / 4 5




95 / 4 3
96 / 3 7
9^ ,' 3 9
96 / 3 9
95 / 4 1
96 / 4






TABLE B-2: SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE DATA: QUESTION 1
How can Field personnel best provide input for managing
change to upper echelons?
METHOD Number of times
mentioned
1. Annual Fin Mgmt Conferences 16
2. Open Lines of Communication 13
3. Proper use of Chain-of-Command 11
4. Point Papers up Chain-of-Command 10
5. Electronic Mail 6
6. Direct interface with Line 5
7. Eliminate BUMED Micromanagement 5
8. BUMED Field visits 4
9. Centralized Communication Control 3
10. Reestablish GEOCOMs 3
11. Field surveys 3
12. Field testing/evaluation of change 2
13. Communication with HSO Controllers 2
14. Increased Field input to POM > 2
15. Through coordinated planning 2
16. As part of TQL 2
17. Increased Field/BUMED rotation 2
18. Centralized goal management 2
19. Field participation on IG team 1
20. Standardized financial operations 1
21. Anonymous suggestions 1
22
.
System change request 1
23. Focus groups 1
24. There is no way 1
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TABLE B-3: SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE DATA: QUESTION 2
How can field level TQL programs be integrated into
the change process?
Method Number of times
mentioned
1. By adopting TQL as a way of life 11
2. Never, TQL is a myth 10
3. When BUMED itself practices TQL 9
4
.
Through adequate training 6
5 When COs embrace TQL 5
6. Through adequate resource allocation 4
7. When used for upward communication 4
8 By sharing experiences with others 4
9 Through PAT teams 4
10. Through goal management 3
11. TQL conferences 1
12. CO' s conferences 1
13. With Total Quality Attitudes 1
14. Participative Mgmt/Quantitative Analysis 1
15. Through long range planning 1
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TABLE B-4: SUMMARY OF QUALITATIVE DATA: QUESTION 3
What Mechanisms or processes should Navy Medicine
develop or utilize to address internal and external forces
for change?




Standardized long range planning 13
2. Establish open lines of communication 10
3. Reduce BUMED to a technical advisor 6
4. Active TQL program 5
5. Increased training in management skills 3
6. Standard financial planning/reporting 3
7 Get deadwood out of Medical Dept 2
8. Stop reorganizing 2
9. Improved information systems 2
10. Marketing 2
11. Centralized goal management 2
12. Survey questionnaires 2
13. Permit innovation in the field 2
14. Participative management 1
15. Pat Teams 1
16. Get Doctors out of management 1
17. Adopt multi-year funding 1
18. Abandon JCHO accreditation process 1
19. Eliminate multiple chain-of-cmds 1
20. Establish Line control over promotions 1
21. Comprehensive officer record reviews 1
22. Remove line control of Navy Medicine 1
23. Concentrate on getting the job done 1
24. Increase Out-Service education 1
25. More liaison with Line 1
26. More coordination between BUMED codes 1
27 Give RLC control of resources 1
28. Eliminate BUMED entirely 1
29. Increase manning of Admin functions 1
30. Active Resource Management Council 1
31. Push PPBS to activity level 1
32
.
Concentrate on Family Medicine 1
33. Newsletters 1
34. Surgeon General visits to the field 1
35. Direct field input to planning process 1
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1. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Initial Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 25 May 1988.
2. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 07 June 1988.
3. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
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Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 2 June 1988.
4. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 22 July 1988.
5. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 26 July 1988.
6. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 07 September 1988.
7. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 07 October 1988.
8. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subject:
Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 05 December 1988.
9. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Memorandum for the Record, Subiect:
Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 31 January 1989-
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Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the Flag Level
Working Group , 15 February 1989.
11. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval
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88.
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Panel, Organization and Management Task Force , 19 OCT
88.
26. Department of the Navy, Briefing for the Blue Ribbon
Panel, Medical Blue Ribbon Panel Overview , 11 APR 89.
27. Department of the Navy, Briefing for the Blue Ribbon
Panel, MAT Progress Report , 04 MAY 89.
28. Department of the Navy, Briefing for the Blue Ribbon
Panel, BRP Medical Organization Implementation , 04
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29. Department of the Navy, Briefing for the Blue Ribbon
Panel, Medical Organization Implementation , 09 JUN
89.
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Working Committee , 28 FEB 90.
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Surgery, BUMEP inst 5450.156 Change 1, Mission and
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